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Maker-Taker Exchange Fees and
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Abstract
Motivated by a desire to enhance market liquidity, exchanges around the
world have recently shown increasing interest in so-called ‘maker-taker’
fee structures. However, little is currently known about the effectiveness
of such schemes. We therefore make use of a natural experiment to empir-
ically assess the impact of maker-taker fees on liquidity. For three months
during 2008, the New Zealand Stock Exchange applied maker-taker ex-
change fees to Australian securities cross-listed on the New Zealand stock
market, thereby allowing us to isolate the change in liquidity attributable
to the introduction of maker-taker fees. We find some evidence suggest-
ing that market depth and trading volume rose in response to the change
in fee structure, but bid-ask spreads remained essentially unchanged. We
conclude that the impact of maker-taker fees on market liquidity remains
an open question.
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1 Introduction
There are increasing differences in the structure of trading fees charged by
stock exchanges around the world. While many retain the traditional struc-
ture that charges the same fee for both market orders and limit orders, oth-
ers have recently introduced so-called ‘maker-taker’ fee arrangements in which
limit order traders (market makers) are charged lower exchange fees than mar-
ket order traders (market takers).1 By offering rebates to liquidity providers
(while continuing to charge liquidity users), exchanges hope to incentivize such
traders and hence increase overall market liquidity.
Somewhat surprisingly however, there has been little formal analysis of
the impact of maker-taker pricing on market liquidity. In the most directly
relevant study, Foucault et al (2009) develop a theoretical model which implies
that trading volume is greater under maker-taker pricing when tick sizes are
small, the number of market makers is low, and market maker monitoring costs
are high. Intuitively, this occurs because in these situations the gains from
trade are skewed towards market takers, and so market makers need additional
incentives to actively monitor and trade. Other studies indirectly suggest that
maker-taker pricing should lower bid-ask spreads. For example, the models of
Glosten (1994) and Ho and Stoll (1983) yield an inverse relationship between
spreads and the number of liquidity providers, a hypothesis for which Huang
and Masulis (1999) find some support. As the introduction of maker-taker
pricing lowers the costs of providing liquidity, the number of liquidity providers
should rise, thus implying a tightening of spreads.2 Moreover, any increase
1Examples of the traditional group include the exchanges of Australia, Hong Kong and
Singapore; those in the latter group include NYSE, Nasdaq, AMEX, Toronto and Switzer-
land. Some exchanges (e.g., NYSE, Nasdaq and the International Securities Exchange) have
also begun making use of maker-taker pricing for options trading.
2Even in the absence of additional liquidity suppliers, maker-taker pricing may lower bid-
ask spreads. Because almost 50% of spreads consists of compensation to liquidity providers
for order processing costs – see Stoll (1989) and Brockman and Chung (1999) – any reduction
in such costs should lower the spread.
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in liquidity supply as the result of maker-taker pricing should also lead to a
greater number of limit orders at each price level, and hence to an increase in
market depth. Finally, of course, any lowering of trading costs should, other
things unchanged, drive up trading volume.
There are thus strong theoretical reasons for believing that the adoption
of maker-taker pricing should lead to an improvement in all three principal
aspects of liquidity – volume, depth and bid-ask spreads. However, the only
empirical test of this hypothesis yields mixed results: Lutat (2010) examines
the 2008 introduction of maker-taker exchange fees by SWX Europe and, for
19 stocks in the Swiss blue-chip index, finds no evidence of any change in
bid-ask spreads, but some limited evidence of increased depth at the best ask
quote.
In some ways Lutat’s (2010) findings are unsurprising, since empirically
identifying the liquidity impact of a move to maker-taker pricing is poten-
tially complicated by two factors. First, the change in pricing structure may
be accompanied by other confounding events that also affect liquidity in the
stocks of interest. Second, the decision to adopt maker-taker pricing may be an
endogenous response to anticipated changes in trading conditions. Both phe-
nomena make it difficult to isolate any liquidity effect that is due to the change
in pricing structure. In this paper, we sidestep these problems by making use of
a natural experiment helpfully conducted by the New Zealand stock exchange
(henceforth NZX) during 2008. Between 1 August and 31 October of that year,
NZX applied maker-taker pricing to the subset of Australian-domiciled com-
panies that were listed on both the New Zealand and Australian exchanges.3
Because there was no corresponding change in pricing structure during the
same period on the Australian stock exchange (henceforth ASX), we are able
to use liquidity in that market as a control for stock-specific changes in liquid-
ity that are unrelated to the introduction of maker-taker fees. And because we
compare liquidity in these stocks during the trial period with liquidity before
and after that time, we also bypass the endogenous choice issue.
Our results are by no means unambiguous. Without controlling for
ASX liquidity in the cross-listed stocks, NZX market liquidity is lower during
the trial period, albeit insignificantly so for most liquidity measures. After
controlling for ASX liquidity (and general market conditions), by contrast,
3In announcing the trial, NZX claimed that it was “...designed to encourage Market
Participants to (trade cross-listed stocks) on NZX, thereby improving underlying market
liquidity.” See NZX Market Participant Pricing Update No. 11, 1 August 2008.
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we find some evidence suggesting that market depth and trading volume rise
in response to the change in fee structure, but that bid-ask spreads remain
essentially unchanged. We conclude that the impact of maker-taker fees on
market liquidity remains an open question.
In the next section, we describe the relevant institutional details for the
ASX and NZX markets. Section 3 describes the data and research method,
while Section 4 reports the results. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
2 Institutional detail
Both the ASX and NZX operate analogous open electronic limit order books
with similar minimum tick sizes. The trading hours of NZX are 10am to
4:45pm NZ time, while ASX operates from 10am to 4pm Australian Eastern
Standard Time (AEST). During our sample period, New Zealand time is two
hours ahead of AEST, with the exception of the period between 28 September
and 4 October, 2008 when the time difference was three hours. Therefore,
trading hours on the ASX and NZX overlap from 10am to 2:45pm on the ASX
and 12am to 4:45 pm on NZX (both in local time).
Between 1 August 2008 and 31 October 2008, NZX trialled maker-taker
exchange fees for 17 ASX-listed firms that were cross-listed on NZX. As can be
seen in Table 1, the quantity of NZX trading activity in these stocks during the
six months centered around the trial period varies considerably: slightly more
than half trade on all or most days, while the remainder trade infrequently or
not at all.
Prior to the trial, the exchange fee charged to each side of a NZX trans-
action was $1 per trade plus 20 basis points of the value of the trade up to a
maximum of $20. Following the introduction of maker-taker pricing on 1 Au-
gust 2008, the exchange fee for limit order traders was eliminated and replaced
by a rebate of five basis points. On 1 November, NZX reverted to the original
fee structure. During the period in question, the ASX left its exchange fee
structure unchanged.
As we shall see below in section 3, the average trade size for the stocks
examined in this study is approximately $20,000 and 1,800 shares. Hence, in
the absence of maker-taker pricing, the exchange fee for an average trade is
$21, or approximately 1.2 cents per share, for each side of the trade. With
maker-taker pricing, the market order trader (taker) was still charged $21 per
trade, or 1.2 cents per share, while the limit order trader (maker) earned a
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Table 1: Cross-listed Australian companies subject to maker-taker pricing on
NZX
Australian-domiciled companies cross-listed on NZX that were subject to
maker-taker pricing between 1 August 2008 and 31 October 2008. Days Traded
reports the number of days the company’s stock was traded on NZX during the
six-month period (131 trading days) 15 June – 15 December 2008. Final Sam-
ple is ‘Yes’ if the company is ultimately included in our data sample, otherwise
it is ‘No’.
Company Name NZX Code Days Traded Final Sample
AMP AMP 129 Yes
Australian Foundation Investment Co. AFI 119 Yes
APN News & Media APN 45 No
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group ANZ 130 Yes
Babcock & Brown Infrastructure BBI 0 No
Downer EDI DOW 0 No
Energy World Corporation EWC 0 No
Goodman Fielder GFF 125 Yes
L & M Petroleum LMP 115 No
Lion Nathan LNN 116 Yes
Pacific Brands PBG 25 No
People Telecom PEO 0 No
Pan Pacific Petroleum PPP 124 No
Tag Pacific TPC 15 No
Telstra Corporation TLS 120 Yes
Transpacific Industries Group TPI 0 No
Westpac Banking Corporation WBC 128 Yes
rebate of $10, or 0.55 cents per share. Consequently, the difference in exchange
fees during the maker-taker trial is 1.75 cents per share.
3 Data and summary statistics
The data used in this study is from the Reuters DataScope Tick History
Database, provided by the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia Pacific.
For both NZX and the ASX, the database includes details of all transactions
records, as well as the best bid and best ask every time there is an update.
Each trade record contains fields with the date, security, price, and volume
as well as a time-stamp which is accurate to the nearest 1/100th of a second.
The bid and ask records contain fields with the date, security, best bid or ask
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price, and the total depth at the best bid or ask price as well as a time-stamp
accurate to the nearest 1/100th of a second.
To estimate the effects of the NZX maker-taker trial on liquidity, we use
a control period that is chronologically close to the trial period and of similar
duration, specifically the 1.5 months before the trial (from 15 June to 31 July,
2008) and the 1.5 months after the trial (from 1 November to 15 December).
Hence, our data draws on observations for the six month period (131 trading
days) extending from 15 June to 15 December 2008.
From the 17 cross-listed stocks subject to the maker-taker trial, we ex-
cluded those that were not traded on NZX during at least 100 of the 131
possible trading days during our sample period. This reduced the sample to
nine stocks. In addition, we deleted two stocks (L&M Petroleum and Pan Pa-
cific Petroleum) that changed minimum tick sizes during the sample period,
leaving a final sample of seven stocks.
A brief summary of the trading activity for these stocks appears in
Table 2. Unsurprisingly, trading is substantially lower in New Zealand — the
average number of trades per day on NZX ranges from three to 14, compared
to a minimum of 177 on ASX. Similarly, the daily number of shares traded is
typically hundreds of times higher on ASX. By contrast, average trade size is
approximately the same on the two exchanges, with NZX trading larger parcels
on four of the seven stocks. Note that the discrepancy in the average price
at which the stocks trade across the two markets reflects the New Zealand-
Australia exchange rate which was approximately equal to 1.20 on average
over the sample period.
To estimate the effect of maker-taker pricing on liquidity, we measure
liquidity in three ways. First, we calculate the bid-ask spread as:
bid-ask spread =
ask - bid
(ask + bid)/2
(1)
where ‘ask’ and ‘bid’ are the best ask and bid quotes respectively. Second,
market depth is defined to be the average dollar value of shares on offer at
the best bid and ask price. To avoid any problems created by stale quotes, we
record a stock’s bid-ask spread and depth on both NZX and ASX at the end
of the minute in which a trade occurs in that stock. We then average across
observations within a given day to create a single observation for that day
for both NZX and ASX. Third, trading volume equals the number of shares
traded multiplied by the price per share during overlapping trading hours on
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Table 2: Summary trading statistics for final sample of stocks
This table documents the average price, average number of shares traded, av-
erage trade size, and the average number of trades per day over the period 15
June to 15 December 2008 on both the New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX)
and Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) for each of the seven cross-listed
stocks used in this paper. Average NZX and ASX prices are expressed in their
respective currencies.
Price Shares Trade Trades
Company Name ($) Traded Size /Day
Panel A: Trading on NZX
AMP 7.66 7701 922 8
Australian Foundation Investment Co. 5.72 7984 2476 3
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 20.6 20511 1315 14
Goodman Fielder 1.73 47448 7402 6
Lion Nathan 10.56 7375 1820 3
Telstra Corporation Ltd 5.19 14894 3570 5
Westpac Banking Corporation 25.39 19650 1377 12
Panel B: Trading on ASX
AMP 6.32 5238518 1566 3359
Australian Foundation Investment Co. 4.70 299038 1704 177
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 16.94 9340384 958 9641
Goodman Fielder 1.43 5392279 3824 1519
Lion Nathan 8.72 1240159 625 1974
Telstra Corporation 4.26 35808174 8369 4348
Westpac Banking Corporation 20.95 8392048 786 10532
NZX and ASX.
Table 3 reports some summary statistics for these three liquidity mea-
sures. Again, the greater trading activity on ASX is evident: average depth
and volume for our sample of cross-listed stocks are many times higher than on
NZX and the average bid-ask spread is 1/10 the size. More importantly, there
is little difference between the experiment and control periods. In fact, all
three measures of liquidity are worse on NZX during the experiment period,
and in the case of the bid-ask spread this difference is statistically significant
at the 1% level.4
4The test for significance is based on Christie (1990). A t-statistic of the difference in
liquidity is estimated for each stock, followed by estimation of a Z-statistic testing whether
the mean t-statistic is significantly different from zero. This two-step procedure eliminates
potential domination by high volume/spread/depth stocks.
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Table 3: Summary liquidity statistics for final sample of stocks
This table reports three measures of average daily liquidity in the sample of
seven cross-listed stocks. The bid-ask spread is the difference between the
best ask and bid quotes normalised by the average of the two quotes. Depth
is the average dollar value of shares on offer at the best bid and ask quote.
Volume equals the number of shares traded multiplied by the price per share
during overlapping trading hours on NZX and ASX. For each stock, the first
two measures are sampled on NZX and ASX at the end of each minute that
there is a transaction on NZX in that stock, and then averaged across the
day. The experiment period runs from from 1 August to 31 October 2008
while the control period includes 15 June to 31 July 2008 and 1 November
to 15 December 2008. Terms in parentheses in the final column are absolute
values of Z-statistics indicating whether or not the mean difference between the
experiment and control periods is statistically significant – see Christie (1990).
Experiment Control Difference
Period Period
Panel A: Trading on NZX
Bid-Ask Spread (%) 2.93 2.47 0.46
(3.7)
Depth ($000 NZ) 21.03 22.13 −1.10
(0.9)
Volume ($000 NZ) 112.57 166.80 −54.23
(0.5)
Panel B: Trading on ASX
Bid-Ask Spread (%) 0.25 0.24 0.01
(0.6)
Depth ($000 AUS) 294.98 276.23 18.76
(0.1)
Volume ($000 AUS) 54353.98 57258.25 −2904.27
(0.7)
While not very suggestive of a maker-taker induced liquidity effect, the
simple statistics appearing in Table 3 ignore some important factors that po-
tentially obscure any impact of maker-taker pricing. For example, panel B of
Table 3 shows that ASX spreads and volume also deteriorated during the ex-
periment period, suggesting the possibility of stock-specific changes in liquidity
that were unrelated to maker-taker pricing. Similarly, any offsetting changes
to the cost of trading, or an overall downturn in NZX liquidity, during the ex-
periment period would also make it difficult to identify any maker-taker effect
on the cross-listed stocks. Clearly, liquidity is affected not only by trading
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fees, but also by other variables that may themselves be correlated with the
fee structure. This confirms the need for multiple regression models that are
able to properly isolate the maker-taker effect.
4 Regression results
We estimate regression models of the general form
Liquidity = a + bX+ cTrial + ε (2)
where Liquidity is the natural logarithm of date t NZX liquidity (spread, depth
or volume) for an equally-weighted portfolio of the seven cross-listed stocks
subject to the maker-taker trial, Trial = 1 if day t is in the experiment period
and zero otherwise, and X is a vector of control variables.
We include the following three variables in X. First, to control for stock-
specific shifts in liquidity, we use the natural logarithm of date t ASX liquidity
for an equally-weighted portfolio of the seven cross-listed stocks. Second, to
control for market-wide shifts in liquidity, we use the natural logarithm of date
t liquidity for an equally-weighted portfolio of the largest 50 stocks listed on
NZX. Third, to control for shifts in the relative cost of cross-country trading,
we also include the natural logarithm of the Australia-New Zealand exchange
rate (expressed as the number of New Zealand dollars needed to buy one
Australian dollar). During the control period of our study, the average value
of the exchange rate was 1.23, but this fell to 1.19 during the experiment
period (a difference that is statistically significant at the 1% level), implying
an increase in the costs of trading on NZX and hence a potentially powerful
offset to the maker-taker inducement.
Estimation of equation (2) yields the results appearing in Table 4, with
three principal findings. First, rather than lowering the bid-ask spread, the
maker-taker trial period is associated with a higher average spread, although
the difference is both economically and statistically close to zero. This may
reflect the prediction of Foucault et al. (2009), who show that maker-taker
pricing will have no effect on spreads if the net benefit to limit order traders
is sufficiently low relative to the minimum tick size. Second, by contrast,
the maker-taker trial period is associated with sizeable improvements in NZX
depth and volume, these rising by approximately 11% and 17% respectively,
although the latter difference is statistically significant at only the 10% level.
Third, our natural experiment approach turns out, ex-post, to be relatively
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Table 4: Regression results: the impact of maker-taker pricing on liquidity
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of date t NZX liquidity (spread,
depth or volume) for an equally-weighted portfolio of the seven cross-listed
stocks subject to the maker-taker trial. ASXL is the natural logarithm of date
t ASX liquidity for an equally-weighted portfolio of the seven cross-listed stocks.
NZXL is the natural logarithm of date t liquidity for an equally-weighted port-
folio of the largest xxx stocks listed on NZX. NZD is the natural logarithm
of the Australia-New Zealand exchange rate (expressed as the number of New
Zealand dollars needed to buy one Australian dollar). Trial = 1 if day t is in the
experiment period and zero otherwise. Terms in parentheses are t-statistics. ∗,
∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respec-
tively.
Dependent Variable
Spread Depth Volume
(%) ($) ($)
Constant −1.51 9.09∗∗∗ 3.11
(1.5) (16.8) (1.1)
ASXL 0.20 −0.02 0.43∗∗∗
(1.3) (0.3) (2.6)
NZD −6.11∗∗∗ 4.01∗∗∗ 1.43
(5.5) (6.9) (1.2)
Trial 0.07 0.11∗∗∗ 0.17∗
(0.7) (2.4) (1.7)
R2 0.27 0.32 0.08
unimportant, as ASX liquidity in the seven cross-listed stocks has no impact on
their NZX liquidity.5 Fourth, a depreciating New Zealand dollar is associated
with significantly lower bid-ask spreads and greater depth (elasticities of -6.11
and 4.01 respectively), while improved ASX liquidity in the seven cross-listed
stocks has a positive effect on NZX volume.
Overall, our results can best be described as mixed. When stock-specific
and market-wide liquidity influences are ignored, the maker-taker experiment
period is associated with weaker NZX liquidity in the affected stocks. When
we control for these external effects, the bid-ask spread is unaffected by maker-
taker pricing, there is some weak evidence for enhanced trading volume, and
there is somewhat stronger evidence for improved depth. One possible reason
5Of course, this does not imply that our natural experiment is of little value. Without
being able to follow such an approach, we would have been unable to rule out the possibility
of stock-specific liquidity shocks.
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for the apparent lack of liquidity response is the relatively minor nature of the
liquidity provider rebate relative to the costs of trading on NZX. Spreads on
NZX are approximately 10 times those on ASX (see 3), so anybody willing to
trade the cross-listed stocks on NZX despite such a large difference in costs
is unlikely to notice much difference created by the maker-taker trial. One
reading of these results, therefore, is that NZX may have been premature in
abandoning the trial after three months, given its apparent beneficial impact
on some aspects of liquidity. Another view, however, would be that any im-
provements in liquidity were insufficiently large to justify the costs involved.
Although the third column of Table 4 suggests that maker-taker pricing did
lead to a rise in trading activity, the resulting improvement in NZX revenues
(17%) is small relative to the fall created by elimination of exchange fees for
one side of each transaction (approximately 50%).
Issues remaining to be addressed and incorporated
• Check whether results are robust to alternative spread measures.
• Check whether results are robust to beginning-of-minute rather than
end-of-minute quotes.
• The presence of fixed costs suggests that the experiment period response
should differ according to size of limit orders, so check whether this
occurs
• Does the experiment period response vary across firms?
• Quantify more precisely the relative ASX-NZX costs associated with
both control and trial periods
• Separate trial-control comparison out by pre- and post-trial control pe-
riods
5 Concluding remarks
Does maker-taker pricing improve liquidity as intended? Despite consider-
able practitioner interest in this question, it has received little attention from
researchers. In this paper, we attempt to shed some light on the issue by
examining the 2008 three-month trial of maker-taker pricing by NZX on the
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shares of cross-listed Australian companies. We find some evidence of an in-
crease in market depth and trading activity, but bid-ask spreads appear to
have been unaffected.
We suspect the ambiguous nature of our results is due, at least in part,
to NZX selecting a sub-optimal form of maker-taker pricing. Currently, very
little is known about optimal fee structures, suggesting an important role for
further theoretical research in this area. Moreover, as more and more varied
exchanges opt for maker-taker pricing (e.g., the South African and Bombay
exchanges), the resulting increase in data availability should enable researchers
to identify which features of maker-taker pricing are most important.
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